







Davidson and the Wittgensteinians on Reasons and Causes

One might say that one of the hallmarks of the contemporary Analytic mainstream is the rejection of some Wittgensteinian views (on philosophy, language, mind, and action). Though a considerable part of such a rejection may hinge on metaphilosophical preferences and, ultimately, even on the sociology of academia, philosophical arguments had a prominent role in this story. Beyond Quine 1951, which was mainly directed against Carnap's 1947 analytic/synthetic distinction, rather than against Wittgenstein's grammatical/factual divide, relevant examples of such antiWittgensteinian arguments are found in Watkins 1957 on the so called Paradigm Case Argument (but see also the controversial but influential Gellner 1959), in Putnam 1962/1975 v. Malcolm 1959 on dreaming and depth grammar, in Kripke's 1972/1980 attack on the so called linguistic doctrine of necessity, in Chomsky 1986 v. the Wittgensteinians on language and mind, and in Fodor's 1975 critique of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument.
	Among such antiWittgensteinian arguments, it is difficult to overemphasize the importance of those presented by Donald Davidson in his 1963 seminal paper “Actions, reasons, and causes”. For in that paper, the standard story tells us, Davidson successfully rejected the Wittgensteinian inspired and then successful slogan that reasons are not causes of action. Normally, the standard story begins with Davidson's so called Master Argument, which runs as follows: “A person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason" (Davidson 1963, 691). This “because”, however, should be considered as the sort of “because” we find in causal explanations. Otherwise, we could not draw the distinction between mere rationalizations and rationalizations which are part of the process of deliberation that prompts the agent to act. If a reason is the cause of an action, then the action depends on that reason, it is brought about by that reason, it is not just in accordance with it. Suppose, for example, that Agnes intentionally goes to the kitchen. She could have gone there to eat some food, to say “hello” to mummy, to look for her sister, and so forth. Her action of going to the kitchen could be justified by any one of those reasons. But Agnes acted only on one of those reasons (= only one of those reasons is the reason why she went to the kitchen). Which one? The cause of her action.
	What one might view as a revisionist account of the same story has recently been put forward. According to D'Oro 2012, “the success of causalism cannot be fully accounted for by considering the outcome of first order debates in the philosophy of action” but “it is to be explained instead by a shift in metaphilosophical assumptions. It is the commitment to a certain second order view of the role and character of philosophical analysis, rather than the conclusive nature of the arguments for causalism, that is largely responsible for the rise of the recent causalist consensus”. According to the revisionist account, such a change in metaphilosophical assumptions should be described “in Strawsonian terms as a change from a descriptive to a revisionary conception of metaphysics" (D'Oro 2012, 207).
	The standard account tells us that Davidson's 1963 anticausalist arguments are sound and successful, and were recognized as such by the majority of the Analytic philosophical community, especially in the US; whereas the revisionist account maintains that Davidson's arguments are sound and successful only on certain metaphilosophical assumptions, accepted, at that time, by many Analytic philosophers (namely, those who were about to become mainstream, especially in the US), while rejected by the Wittgensteinians. Therefore, the two rival accounts seem to share at least two central claims: (i) that in his 1963 paper Davidson argued for causalism and against Wittgensteinian anticausalism in the philosophy of action and (ii) that his arguments were regarded by most Analytic philosophers as sound and successful.
	The aim of this paper is twofold: to challenge view (i) above, shared by the standard and the revisionist accounts, according to which Davidson simply and straightforwardly argued for a form of antiWittgensteinian causalism in the philosophy of action, and (concerning point (ii) above) to redescribe and reassess the role played in this story, and the success achieved in the Analytic philosophical community, by Davidson's 1963 article. In the first part of the paper, I shall briefly describe the best known Wittgensteinian inspired anticausalist argument, namely, the (in)famous Logical Connection Argument, and Davidson's critique of it; I shall then outline three further Wittgensteinian anticausalist arguments, one having to do with the non nomological character of rational action explanations (as opposed to the presence of laws in causal explanations), another one based on the idea that we have first person authority over our reasons for acting (but not over the causes of our behaviour), yet another one associated with the claim that contents of mental states (rather than mental states themselves) can really justify (rather than merely explain) our actions. In the second part, by pointing out some conceptual distinctions, the most important of which is the distinction between causal explanations, on the one hand, and statements describing causal relations between events, on the other hand, I shall argue that Davidson's view is not causal in the traditional sense. In the third and last part, I shall discuss Davidson's attitude towards the three previously sketched Wittgensteinian anticausalist arguments (having to do, respectively, with nomicity, first person knowledge, and justification), and I shall further investigate nature and sources of the disagreement between Davidson and the Wittgensteinians in the philosophy of action.

1. Wittgensteinian AntiCausalism
The polemical target of Wittgensteinian anticausalism in the philosophy of action is a traditional causal view of action and action explanation. According to such a view, intentional actions are actions or movements caused, perhaps in a peculiar way, by certain mental states or events (such as beliefs and desires), whose occurrence causally explains the occurrence of the action (or movement). For example, the rational explanation of agent A's catching the bus expresses the reasons why A caught the bus: she wanted to go to a certain place, and believed that the bus was going just there. Her "desire" and belief caused her action.
	Perhaps, the best known Wittgensteinian criticism of traditional causal views of action  explanation is the so called Logical Connection Argument, which can be (in fact, has been) formulated in several different ways. Melden 1961, for example, writes that "if ... the motive were some event either concurrent with or antecedent to the action of raising the arm, there would needs be a logically necessary connection between two distinct events, the alleged motive and the action, however it is described. This is impossible if the sequence motive→action is a causal relation”. And he adds as a qualification: “It is equally impossible if the motive is some interior mental event distinct from that event that is the action of raising the arm. Hence, if the motive explains what was done, the explanation is not and cannot be the type of explanation exhibited in the explanation of natural phenomena, whether these be the excitation of muscles, the movements of limbs, the explosion of petrol vapours or the behaviour of falling bodies" (88-89).
	Von Wright 1971 argues to the same effect but focuses on the notion of “Humean” causation: according to the very notions of cause and effect, probably provided by Hume, a cause must be logically independent from its effect, that is, the former can be described and identified independently from the latter, and viceversa. However, von Wright argues, since a certain action and the reasons for which one does that action are logically connected, it follows that reasons cannot be causes of action. In different phases of his thought, von Wright partly modified that argument. In particular, he came to deny that having reasons implies acting in accordance with them, even when there is nothing, which prevents the agent from acting: he imagined a logically possible situation, in which a man is "firmly resolved to assassinate the tyrant. He has access to his room, aims at him with a loaded revolver, but cannot bring himself to pull the trigger. Nothing which we later find out about him”, von Wright argued “would make us think that he had changed his intention or come to a different opinion about the things required of him to make it effective" (von Wright 1976, 422). That's why it is more correct to say that the logical connection between reasons and action obtains only ex post actu (von Wright 1971).
	Davidson's main source about the Logical Connection Argument seems to be Melden 1961: many examples discussed in “Actions, reasons and causes” are taken from it. Davidson, however, not only thinks that it is not clear what the Logical Connection Argument means (it is perhaps worth noting, here, that von Wright's 1971 more perspicuous formulation was not available yet); but he is also convinced that, if we try to make it clear, then the argument turns out to be false. Davidson's 1963 clearer formulation of the Logical Connection Argument is the following: since a reason makes an action intelligible by redescribing it, we do not have two events, but only one under different descriptions, while causal relations (in the Humean sense) demand two distinct events. According to Davidson, if this is the Logical Connection Argument, then the argument fails, for three main reasons. First, a cause is a different thing from its effect; but also a reason is a different thing from the action it explains. For, as is obvious, reasons are not identical with actions, since they are beliefs and “pro attitudes” (for example, desires), and beliefs and attitudes are not actions. Secondly, the practice of redescribing events in terms of their causes is as normal and non controversial as the practice of redescribing actions in terms of their reasons. For example, as Davidson puts it, suppose that someone was injured: “we could redescribe this event ‘in terms of a cause’ by saying he was burned" (1963, 692). Thirdly, the Logical Connection Argument seems to presuppose that causal relations are empirical rather that logical. But consider the synthetic statement “A caused B”. And suppose it is true that, say, “the cause of B = A”. By substituting we have “the cause of B caused B”, which is analytic. Hence, the status as analytic or synthetic of this statement depends on how events are described. And the same holds for the explanatory value of the statement (Davidson 1963, 696).
	Now, a couple of comments on the role played in the overall story by Davidson's critique of the Logical Connection Argument. To begin with, I do not wish to deny that, in the 50s and the early 60s, some Wittgensteinians defended or just assumed something like Davidson's reformulation of the Logical Connection Argument. Moreover, there's little doubt that Davidson's critique of such an argument had a prominent role in discrediting, within the Analytic community (especially in the US), the reputation of the Wittgensteinian tradition in the philosophy of action. There are two reasons, however, not to think that this is the end of the story. First, it would be inappropriate to call, simply and straightforwardly, “antiWittgensteinian” Davidson's polemical attitude toward the Logical Connection Argument: not only because some of Davidson's main critical points heavily rely upon the notion of “under a description”, introduced by Anscombe 1957 (arguably, at that time, the one most important Wittgensteinian inspired book entirely dedicated to the philosophy of action), but also because Wittgenstein himself accepted something like Davidson's idea that the status as conceptual or factual of a sentence depends on how things are described, for Wittgenstein put forward a “functional” view of grammatical rules (Glock 1996), according to which something is a rule if it is used in a certain way, namely, as a standard of correctness (and this is the very reason why, as Wittgenstein puts it, “any empirical proposition can be transformed into a postulate, and then becomes a norm of description”, but also the reverse can occur; Wittgenstein 1953, §321, but see also, for example, Wittgenstein 1969, §97). Incidentally, it is worth noting not only that, twelve years after Quine's attack on the first dogma of empiricism, Davidson was still using the allegedly “false” concepts of analytic and synthetic, but also that Davidson's Master Argument ultimately consisted in grammatical remarks, in the Wittgensteinian sense, on the logical web of expressions such as "cause", "reason", "action" and "explanation" (Engel 1996). Moreover, such remarks seem to be descriptive rather than revisionary: Davidson seems to be interested in making us realize how the concepts of cause, reason, action, and explanation actually work in our ordinary conceptual scheme, rather than in fostering a new and improved understanding of such notions. Thus, Davidson seems to be closer, metaphilosophically, to the Wittgensteinian tradition than D'Oro 2012 seems to suggest (but for a more detailed comparison between Davidson and Quine, on the one hand, and a Wittgensteinian inspired view of language and mind, on the other hand, see Glock 2003).
	Secondly, the Logical Connection Argument is by no means the core of, let alone the only argument belonging to, the Wittgensteinian anticausalist view of action and action explanation. In fact, in the work of Wittgenstein and his pupils and followers, there are at least three further arguments to the effect that rational explanations of intentional actions are not, and cannot be, causal in the traditional sense. The first argument relies on the notion of nomicity. A causal connection, as many would agree, is nomic: this means that a causal statement, which asserts that a causal relation holds between two events, requires laws governing (some descriptions of) the two events. Explanations of actions in terms of reasons for acting, however, do not involve such laws, but neither because the laws involved in explanations of actions are much more complicated than those we find in explanations of purely physical events (as suggested by Hempel 1968), nor because they are so obvious that we rarely take them into account (as pointed out by Popper 1945). Rather, the reason is, as von Wright 1971 puts it, that the motivational “mechanism” is not causal, but rather teleological.
	The second Wittgensteinian anticausalist argument is based on the contrast between fallible hypothesis and first person knowledge (see Schroeder 2010). Agents, Wittgenstein suggested, have first person authority about their reasons for acting (that is, the reason of an action is what the agent sincerely claim to be his reason); whereas a statement describing the causes of one's actions can only be a fallible hypothesis, a “conjecture” (Wittgenstein 1958, 15; Schroeder 2010). For example, Wittgenstein once said: “Let us suppose a train driver sees a red signal flashing and brings the train to a stop.  In response to the question: ‘Why did you stop?’, he answers perhaps: ‘Because there is the signal “Stop!”’. One wrongly regards this statement as the statement of a cause whereas it is the statement of a reason.  The cause may have been that he was long accustomed to reacting to the red signal in such and such a way or that in his nervous system permanent connections of pathways developed such that the action follows the stimulus in the manner of a reflex, or yet something else.  The cause need not be known to him.  By contrast, the reason is what he states it is” (Baker 2003, 110-12).
	The third argument relies on the distinction between explanatory mental states (or events) and justificatory contents of mental states (or events). Although, for example, the occurrence of a thought that p may cause a person to act, what could be invoked as a reason, that is, as a justification of that person's action, is not the occurrence of the thought, but the content of the thought (for this formulation, see Schroeder 2010): that is, the reason of the action is just that p. The same goes for other kinds of propositional mental states (different from thoughts). For example, as Waismann writes, based on Wittgenstein's dictations: “The attending to the rule can indeed be the cause for the rule being followed. … [But] the cause of an action can never be referred to, to justify the action. I may justify a calculation by appealing to the laws of arithmetic, but not by appealing to my attending to these laws.  The one is a justification, the other a causal explanation” (Waismann 1965, 123).
	An interesting version of the latter kind of argument is put forward by Anscombe 1957. Preliminarily, Anscombe acknowledges that there are mental causes (“what went on in my mind and issued in the action”, 1957, § 11): for example, the sudden vision of a mouse, which makes me jump. Such mental causes, she tells us, can cause intentional actions, can be known “without observation” and be reported by the agent himself: "The effect of an intention”, she writes, “may even be an action in execution of that intention" (1983, 179) (perhaps, one might say, here she has in mind so called deviant causal chains; for an illuminating investigation on this issue see Hyman 2013). She insists, however, that one's action is not intentional because it is caused by a mental cause, to which we refer in explaining our action; in other words, a mental cause is not a reason for acting. The causalist's mistake is, in Anscombe's words, "to think that the relation being done in execution of a certain intention, or being done intentionally, is a causal relation between act and intention" (1983, 179): intentions can be causes, but in explanations of actions in terms of reasons they are not invoked in a causal capacity. What I take to be her main argument runs as follows (see Anscombe 1957, §§ 13-16). On the one hand, one can do something unintentionally, but nonetheless as the effect of a mental cause: for example, I knock the cup over because I suddenly see a frightening face. On the other hand, we often do not cite such mental causes but, nonetheless, our action is intentional. Anscombe takes into account cases in which one answers to the question “Why (did you do that)?” by mentioning, as a reason for acting, what she calls a “backward looking motive”. She points, for example, to cases of revenge and gratitude, pity or remorse, cases in which "something that has  happened ... is given as the ground of an action ... that is good or bad for the person ... at whom it is aimed" (1957, § 13). For example, one asks me why I killed X, and I answer by giving the reason of my action: "because he killed my brother". The reason of my action is that he killed my brother (1957, § 14). But the “fact” (or, if you like, the “proposition”) that he killed my brother is not a mental cause, simply because it is not mental at all. Moreover, Anscombe points out, if one could show a posteriori "that either the action for which he has revenged himself, or that in which he has revenged himself, was quite harmless or was beneficial, he ceases to offer a reason" (1957, § 14, 22). But nothing similar would happen with an assertion on mental causality. In other words, if things in the world had come out differently, if, for example, the action for which he has revenged himself were come out differently, the agent would have ceased to offer a reason, because the fact would not have obtained: in Anscombe's example, if X had not killed my brother (it were only an accident, in which X had not played any significant role), my revenge would cease to have the reasons it appeared to have, and in fact, it would not be a revenge any more.
	I suggest that Anscombe is here invoking, though in nuce and without using that expression, the concept of “good reason” (or “normative”, as opposed to “motivational”, reason), a notion that makes sense of the idea of a pratical reality (as illustrated by Dancy 2000; but see also Williams 1980): good reasons are reasons that there are in favour or against the action, like in the case of moral reasons; they are normative, both because they approve or disapprove, are favourable or adverse toward an action, and because they make the action right or wrong, wise or rash. I also suggest that Anscombe's Backward Looking Motives Argument can be read as an early, perhaps rough and non completely explicit version of a quite powerful anticausalist argument, recently defended by Dancy 2000 (118-19), which runs as follows: motivational reasons (the reasons in the light of which one acts) must be the sort of things capable of being among normative reasons (the reasons that there are or that one has); otherwise, it would be senseless to ask, as we in fact do in everyday discourse, whether the agent actually acted for a good reason or, which is the same, whether the reason, for which he acted, was a good reason; therefore, motivational reasons cannot be mental states or events, let alone mental causes, for a mental state, like one's believing or one's desiring, is neither a fact (in Anscombe's words, “something that has happened”, taken and described in a certain way) nor a rule (like in the Wittgenstein/Waismann example quoted above).

2. Davidson's Non Causal View
According to a traditional causal theory, causally explaining A by mentioning B means that there is a causal relation between A and B, and that the explanatory capacity of the explanation consists in the reference to that relation. However, as emphasized by Stoutland 1999 (thus diverging from earlier Stoutland 1976 and 1982, partly under the influence of Child 1994), this is not Davidson's theory of action explanation. Basically, the reason is that Davidson 1963 draws a sharp divide between statements truly expressing causal relations between events, and statements causally explaining events.
	Causal relations, Davidson tells us, hold between events, which are conceived of as temporal individual entities that can be described in many different ways (Davidson 1967). That two events are causally related, however, does not depend on how they are described: singular causal statements, that is, statements that express causal relations between events, are extensional. Moreover, a causal relation between two events cannot hold, unless there is a “strict law”, instantiated by some true descriptions of both events. Such law is a “homonomic” generalization, which is not only lawlike, but also “precise, explicit and as exceptionless as possible” (Davidson 1970, 219, but in 1993, 8 he would have said “as deterministic as nature can be found to be”), and which can be formulated without caveats and ceteris paribus conditions; events that are described must belong to a “closed system”, such that, to borrow Stoutland's explication, “whatever can affect the system is part of the system being described” (1999, 192, but see also Davidson 1993).
	According to Davidson, only (an ideal) physics describes such systems, and therefore events with causal relations must have some physical description, or, in other words, they must be physical events (Davidson 1993). This does not entail that there are not causal relations either between mental events (that is, events with a mental description) or between mental and physical events; in fact, as I have pointed out above, in Davidson's view causal relations hold regardless of how events are described. The point is just that, in order for a mental event to be a relatum of a causal relation, it must have at least one physical description, that is, it must be also physical (Davidson 1970).
	Davidson thinks, however, that we can know and describe a causal relation between two events without (causally) explaining anything. The reason is, again, that causal relations hold no matter how events are described. For example, sentences such as "the cause of B caused B" and  "what he referred to yesterday is the cause of what happened to her ten years ago” refer to causal relations between events. But they seem not to explain what has happened in the two cases (Davidson 1963, 696 and 1967, 692; see also Stoutland 1999).
	By a similar token, in Davidson's view, we can have causal explanations without causal relations. In Davidson's theory of action, the agents' beliefs and pro attitudes seem, at least prima facie, to play the role of explanantes (but more on this in the next section). Such beliefs and attitudes, however, are states rather than events. Therefore, one might say, in Davidson's view there cannot be a causal relation between beliefs and desires, on the one hand, and the action performed, on the other hand, because the causal relation holds only between two events (Davidson 1967, 702). Why?  Here is a tempting line of argument: though the differences between states and events can be variously articulated, the main difference being, perhaps, that states are dispositional, whereas events are episodic (Davidson 1963, 693), here the most relevant difference seems to be that states are, as it were, too “static”, whereas events are sufficiently “dynamic” to cause something, including actions (but see below, in section 3.,  for further discussion on this point).
	However, one might object as follows. After all, Davidson maintains that, since beliefs and desires causally explain actions, which are events, there must be at least one event “associated with” such mental states that has a causal relation to the action. Such an event is often the “onslaught” (that is, the beginning or forming) of a mental state. And, in virtue of its being causally related to the action, it is also a physical event, probably a neural one, ultimately governed by strict laws belonging to physics (Davidson 1963, 694).
	The reply to this objection is that putting the onslaught into the picture does not make Davidson's theory a causal theory, in the traditional sense. Let me explain why. First, Davidson never asserts that a causal explanation of an action requires referring to the associated event (such as the onslaught); in fact, normally we give a causal explanation of an action without knowing which event is associated with the belief and the desire (the reasons of the action), let alone its physical (more specifically, neural) description. Generally speaking, according to Davidson, we give a causal explanation of something without knowing the causal relation involved and the physical description of the relata (including the onslaught of a mental state in the case of rational/causal explanations). Even more generally, causal explanations essentially depend on how things are described: they are intensional. And this is enough to abandon the idea that referring to causal relations have explanatory value, since causal relations hold no matter how things are described. According to Davidson, if one wants to causally explain something, including intentional actions, one is not required to identify and refer to a causal relation.
	Secondly, Davidson is also convinced that we can (in fact, often do) have causal explanations without (reference to) strict laws. In his view, a causal explanation does not require the existence of (let alone the reference to) stric homonomic laws, but only of "rough heteronomic generalizations" (Davidson 1970). The former concern only physical events, but we never (or, to be optimistic, extremely rarely) know the physical descriptions of the mental event that we consider. We usually observe a singular causal relation without knowing which strict law is involved. On the contrary, when we causally explain something, we do know and use a rough (that is, non precise, somewhat implicit, and non exceptionless) generalization, which gives us the explanatory connection between the "cause" and the "effect".
	Davidson's so called Anomalous Monism brings us to the same conclusions. As is well known, in 1970 Davidson argued for the compatibility of the three following principles: a) The Principle of Causal Interaction, according to which there are causal relations between mental events and physical events (as well as between mental events and other mental events); b) The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality, according to which events that are causally related fall under strict laws; c) The Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental, according to which there are no strict psychophysical laws (as opposed to rough generalizations). Now, given that, in Davidson's view, rational explanations of action require some reference to the mental (but more on this point in the next section); given Davidson's quite traditional (e.g. Hempelian) belief according to which the explanatory value of a theory or even of a single sentence depends on some sort of generalization governing the events about which the theory or the sentence speaks; and given also the Anomalism of the Mental, which entails that explanatory generalizations are strict laws in the case of physics, but only rough generalizations in the case of folk psychology: it follows that Davidson view of action explanation is definitely not a causal theory in the traditional sense.
	Up to now, I have shown what, in Davidson's view, causal explanations are not: they are not statements mentioning causal relations and stric laws. Accordingly, the meaning of the word "causal", which Davidson applies to rational explanations, is so broad and loose that the specific reference to causal relations is lost. In the last part of this section, I wish to underline that Davidson 1963 explains also what a causal explanation of human actions positively is. He suggests that "when we ask why someone acted as he did, we want to be provided with an interpretation" and that explanations of actions, which (running the risk of creating a terminological misunderstanding) he  insists to call "causal", are nothing but redescriptions of the actions, often placed "in a wider social, economic, linguistic, or evaluative context" (Davidson 1963, 691). This is a view, which (apart from terminology) many Wittgensteinians would approve without hesitation, or, in other words, it is a conception, which seems to make Davidson a quasi Wittgensteinian philosopher of action.  As suggested by Stoutland 1999, Davidson's pars construens seems to confirm what von Wright 1971 declares in the preface: "Those who think that actions have causes often use 'cause' in a much broader sense than I do when I deny this. Or they may understand 'action' differently. It may well be, then, that 'actions' in their sense have 'causes' in my sense, or that 'actions' in my sense have 'causes' in theirs".
	Finally, the notion of interpretation, which plays a central role in Davidson's positive account of action explanation, is strictly connected to the normativity of the mental or, more precisely, to the fact that the way in which we ascribe beliefs, desires and other mental states to people is governed by principles of rationality, which tends to make sense of  such mental states and to maximize their overall consistency (for example, it seems that we could not interpret the belief of someone who systematically violates very simple logical laws). Now, one of the ultimate reasons of the Anomalism of the Mental and of the deep divide between causal relations and rational/causal explanations (the other reason being the so called Holism of the Mental) is the fact that, in Davidson's view, natural sciences (especially physics) have no place for normativity.

3. Nature and Sources of the Disagreement
In order to understand where exactly the disagreement between Davidson and the Wittgensteinians lies, an investigation on Davidson's attitude toward the three further anticausalist arguments sketched above (having to do, respectively, with nomicity, first person authority, and justification) is required.
	Let us start from the Nomicity Argument. Davidson seems to agree with the Wittgensteinians that rational explanations (what he somewhat idiosyncratically calls "causal explanations") are not nomic, whereas causal relations require laws. Of course, this is true only if "law" is meant as strict law. But there are two things worth noting here. First, it is highly unlikely that the Wittgensteinians who conceive of causation as nomic intend to suggest that reasons are not causes because in rational explanations no rough heteronomic generalizations (in Davidson's sense) are involved. Rather, they seem to have in mind something like strict laws (in Davidson's sense). Secondly, not all the Wittgensteinians adopt the notion of nomic causation. Tellingly, Anscombe  does not. In Anscombe 1971, for example, she argues against the idea that causes necessitate effects, and against the related idea that causation requires laws and generalizations. "Causality – she writes – consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes" (1971, 136). According to Anscombe, the analysis in terms of necessity and universality neither clarifies nor explicates the immediate and observable derivativeness of the effect (which is something that “lies under our noses”). In fact, "it forgets about it" (Anscombe 1971, 136). Something similar arises in the debate about memory between Anscombe and Malcolm (who were both pupils of Wittgenstein, as is well known): whereas Malcolm 1963 and 1970 denies that memories are properly caused by something past, Anscombe 1981 maintains that, in the case of memory, an intuitive and non nomic notion of causality is involved.
	Now, consider the First Person Authority Argument. Davidson 1963 seems not to disagree with the Wittgensteinians that agents have first person authority over their reasons for acting; and there's no doubt that he also thinks that we make fallible hypotheses about the physical description of the relata involved in a causal relation, and about the strict laws governing them. Of course, as is well known, Davidson later provided his own theory of first person knowledge,  and that was not a Wittgensteinian view at all (see, for example, Hacker's 1997 Wittgensteinian inspired criticism of Davidson 1984). That happened, however, in 1984, and it has almost nothing to do with the topic of this paper, which is mainly concerned with the role played by "Actions reasons and causes" (published in 1963) in the history of Analytic philosophy.
	Finally, a brief look at Davidson's attitude toward the Wittgensteinian Justification Argument. Prima facie, here we find a real philosophical disagreement between Davidson and the Wittgensteinians (especially Anscombe), for Davidson explicitly assumes, at the very beginning of his 1963 article,  that reasons are beliefs and pro attitudes. I think, however, that this is not yet the last word on the issue, and some qualification is required. Hence, let me elaborate a bit further. Recall, first, that Davidson does not think that reasons are mental events (such as the onslaught associated to the agent's beliefs and pro attitudes). So are reasons mental states? If the relevant ontological difference between events and states is that states are static, while events are dynamic, the answer should be a straightforward “No”: in fact, if the reference to events (something dynamic, provided with causal capacity) does not explain an action, then why should the reference to states (something static, lacking causal capacity) be more explanatory? Perhaps a possible way out could be to express the relevant ontological difference between states and events in terms of the distinction between mental dispositions and mental episodes, based on the belief that the reference to dispositions arguably has (more) explanatory value. I think, however, that there is a better way to interpret Davidson here, based on Davidson's 1967 accepting "the linguistic evidence for a deep distinction, in our use of 'cause', 'effect', and related words", illustrated by Zeno Vendler, between occurrences of verb nominalizations that are fact like, and occurrences that are event like (Vendler 1962, Davidson 1967, 162). This suggests that, in Davidson's view, our reasons for acting (that is, what explains actions in our rational/causal explanations) are "things" of the form 'thap p' (“facts” or “propositions”, if you like, but please don't put too much metaphysical weight on such idioms, because Davidson himself asks us not to do so; see, for example, Davidson 1969). According to Davidson, however, what rationally explains an action is the combination of two different "facts": that the agent has a certain belief and that he/she has a certain pro attitude toward the action. This could partly explain Davidson's fast and ultimately misleading suggestion, at the beginning of “Actions, reasons and causes”, that reasons are mental states. And this is also where the real disagreement with Anscombe lies. For according to Anscombe, the agent's reasons is, often, (simply) that p. For example, why did the agent A kill X? Anscombe answers: because X killed A's brother. Davidson would say: because A believed that X killed her brother, and she wanted to revenge herself.
	Let me briefly summarize the conclusions tentatively established up to now. There is no deep philosophical disagreement between Davidson and the Wittgensteinians in the philosophy of action, for, as I have shown in the previous section, the Davidsonian divide between causal explanations and causal relations is sufficiently analogous to the Wittgensteinian divide between reasons and causes. There is a light (perhaps irrelevant) disagreement between them about the issue of nomicity: the Wittgensteinians hold that rational explanations don't involve laws, whereas Davidson distinguishes between strict laws and rough generalizations. But there is also a real, philosophical disagreement (and this is the point on which I partly agree with what above I called the standard account of the story), though it is less deep than scholars have often suggested (for example very recently, as emphasized by Coliva forthcoming, even the otherwise excellent Tanney 2013 takes Davidson as its main opponent and polemical target, that is, as a paradigmatic supporter of a causal theory of action, in the traditional sense). This philosophical disagreement has two main sources. First, Davidson's attack on the Logical Connection Argument. On the one hand, we can grant both that, in the early 60s, it was not clear what that argument really meant, and that the argument reformulated by Davidson was unsound (as pointed out by Davidson 1963). On the other hand, however, the Logical Connection Argument was just one of the anticausalist arguments presented by the Wittgensteinians. Secondly, the real philosophical disagreement in question depends on Davidson's claiming that the reason of A's action is that A believed that p (and that A "desired" that q), whereas Anscombe thinks that the reason of A's action is often, simply, that p.
	What I've just called the real philosophical disagreement between Davidson and Anscombe requires some more comments. As I said above, Davidson 1963 states apparently without argument that reasons are beliefs and pro attitudes (unless one regards the Master Argument as his argument for that thesis, but see below for a discussion of this point); and, although he doesn't tell us anything explicit about that, he seems to think that his disagreement with the Wittgensteinians does not lie here. Furthermore, Anscombe's view is more sophisticated than Davidson's, for it allows us to distinguish between cases in which our reason is that p, and cases in which it is that we believe that p. For example, that I believe that the cliff is crumbling is my reason for avoiding climbing it, because having that belief would be more likely to fall off, since I would get nervous; this case is different from the one in which my reason is that the cliff is crumbling (the example is discussed  by Dancy 2000, 124). Finally, what about Davidson's Master Argument, which many people conceive of as the main argument for causalism? I have already underlined that, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the Master Argument could be seen as a piece of Wittgensteinian philosophy, that is, as a descriptive conceptual analysis of the notion of cause and its related concepts. But notice also that Anscombe 1957 provided us “in advance” with a non causalist way of interpreting the point of (something like) Davidson's Master Argument. In fact, she explicitly asserts that it is impossible that, in the case of an intentional action performed in the light of certain reasons, in the agent's mind there are no mental states of believing (and/or of desiring) at all. Such mental states are not the agent's reasons, but they must have been in the agent's mind at the time of action. There is a case, Anscombe's tells us, in which the question "Why?" cannot be applied (that is, a case in which an action is not done for and explained in terms of reasons): the case "in which the action is somehow characterized as one in which there is no room for … mental causality" (Anscombe 1957, § 17). Hence, such mental states are conditiones sine qua non of the intentional action and of the rational explanation. I wish to suggest that, in the light of this, we should acknowledge not only that the disagreement with Davidson is perhaps even less deep than I have indicated up to now, but also that, once again, Anscombe's view turns out to be preferable, as indirectly but nicely illustrated by an analogy by Lloyd Humberstone reported by Dancy (2000, 136): consider the idea that "nobody ever got sent to prison for robbing banks, but only for getting caught robbing banks”; since one is not sentenced to imprisonment, unless one is not caught, it could seem that what, in virtue of which one is sentenced to imprisonment is that one is caught; but actually one is condemned in virtue of having robbed banks, while having being caught is only a conditio sine qua non. By a similar token, in many cases Davidson mistakenly thinks that when I provide a reason for my action, I should mention the mental states I had in mind at the time of action (for example, I say that my reason is that I believed that p), whereas Anscombe correctly underlines that the reason explaining my action is often, simply, that p, and my believing that p at the time of action is nothing but a conditio sine qua non of my action.
	The picture is not complete unless I underline that the historical/philosophical role of Davidson 1963 is also partly based on a partial misunderstanding, ultimately depending, in its turn, on a point of terminology, that is, on Davidson's extremely broad, not to say eccentric, use of the term "causal" in his thesis that “Rational explanations are causal". The misunderstanding is also associated with Davidson's putting emphasis on two further points. The first was the idea, reported at the very beginning of his 1963 paper, according to which his goal was "to defend the ancient and commonsense position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation" (1963, 685): this was partly misleading because, as I have shown above, his theory was not causal in the traditional sense. The second point was the related idea that his polemical target was the Wittgensteinian point of view: in a footnote, Davidson provided a list of his polemical objects, from G.E.M. Anscombe,  Intention, Oxford, 1957 to Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action, London, 1959,  from H.L.A. Hart and A. M. Honore, Causation in the Law, Oxford, 1959 to William Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford, 1957, and to most of the books in the series edited by R.F. Holland, Studies in Philosophical Psychology, including Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, London, 1963, and A.I. Melden, Free Action, London, 1961. This list run the risk of misleadingly suggesting that the Wittgensteinian view of action and action explanation was more homogeneous than it actually was.
	Moreover, Davidson's attitude towards the Wittgensteinians was quite peculiar in the US Analytic movement at that time. In 1963 Davidson, then known for some early work on decision theory (Davidson & Suppes 1957), already had personal acquaintance with several Wittgensteinians: not only he shared with some of them a common training in classical philosophy, but he also invited many of them at Stanford in the late 50s. On the contrary, most American Analytic philosophers had a very limited knowledge of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
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